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1
INTEREST OF AMICI
Amici are law and business school professors at
schools throughout the United States.1 We have no
personal interest in the outcome of this case, but a
professional interest in seeing that patent law develops
in a way that encourages rather than retards innovation
and creativity. Institutional affiliations are given for
identification purposes only.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case presents two issues that justify this Court’s
review.
First, the Federal Circuit upheld a finding of design
patent infringement based on the very same Apple designs
that it found functional under trade dress law. Such a
counterintuitive outcome is possible because the Federal
Circuit has constructed a highly constrained definition of
functionality in design patent law, which is at odds with
this Court’s precedent in both utility patent and trade
dress cases. Coupled with its recent re-interpretation
of the design patent infringement standard, the Federal
Circuit’s approach to functionality makes it quite likely
that defendants will be held liable for doing nothing more
than implementing functional features that could not be
protected with utility patents. This Court should grant
1. No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in
part, and no such counsel or party made a monetary contribution
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No
person other than the amici, or their counsel, made a monetary
contribution intended to fund its preparation or submission. The
parties have consented to the fi ling of this brief.
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review to address the relationship of functionality to
design patent infringement.
Second, despite Samsung’s own patents, its engineering
and design work, and the fact that technologies developed
by Google and countless other inventors are incorporated
in Samsung’s phones, the Federal Circuit affi rmed the
jury’s damages award of Samsung’s entire profit from
phones that were held to infringe Apple’s design patents.
Under the Federal Circuit’s reading of 35 U.S.C. §289,
design patent infringers, unlike infringers of copyrights,
trademarks, or utility patents on technical inventions, are
liable for their entire profits from an infringing product,
even if the patented design is only a minor feature of that
product.
That draconian rule is in conflict with both the
Second’s and Sixth Circuit’s statutory interpretations,
dates back more than a century to circumstances that no
longer apply today, and is inconsistent with this Court’s
rule for utility patent damages. As applied to a modern,
multicomponent product, the entire profit rule drastically
overcompensates design patent owners, undervalues
technological innovation and manufacturing know-how,
and raises troubling questions about how to handle other
potential claims to a share of the defendant’s profits. The
rule applies even to innocent design patent infringement,
which recent Federal Circuit infringement precedent has
rendered more likely.
This Court should grant certiorari to review the
meaning of section 289, an issue it has never addressed.
Section 289 should be read, in accordance with wise
policy and the remainder of the patent statute, to limit
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the award of profits to those attributable to infringement
of the design patent.
ARGUMENT
II. The Federal Circuit’s Functionality Doctrine
Gives Unwarranted Scope to Design Patents and
Undermines the Promotion of Technological
Progress
A.

T he Fe d e r a l C i r c u it’s D e sig n Pat e nt
Functionality Doctrine Is Inconsistent with
this Cour t’s Constitutionally- Grounded
Approach to Trade Dress Functionality

The basic rule of design patent infringement has
been the same since Gorham Co. v. White, which held
that a design patent is infringed “if, in the eye of an
ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser
usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if
the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer,
inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other.”
81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871). Crucially, design patents protect
only ornamentation. They may not cover the functional
aspects of a product. 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (“a design patent
may only be granted for a “new, original, and ornamental
design”).
Functionality doctrine channels protection for a
product’s visual ornamentation and shape toward design
patent protection, while claims to useful solutions are
directed to utility patents. The doctrine prevents parties
from obtaining a patent on the functional aspects of
inventions that are obvious, a limitation this Court has
held is constitutionally required. Graham v. John Deere
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Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007). Utility patent doctrine aims
to balance protections needed to induce invention with
follow-on inventors’ need to build on prior technologies
and to ensure access to technologies in the public domain.
In the trade dress context, this Court has recognized
that overreaching protection can undermine this balance
and must be reined in by the functionality doctrine. See
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532
U.S. 23, 29-30, 34 (2001) (“The Lanham Act does not exist
to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating
a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law
and its period of exclusivity.”)
The Federal Circuit has eviscerated the functionality
doctrine in design patent law, narrowing it almost to
the point of nonexistence. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna &
Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress and Competition in
Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Michael Risch,
Functionality and Graphical User Interface Design
Patents, 17 STAN. T ECH. L. REV. 53 (2014). Under the
Federal Circuit’s reading, a design is functional—and thus
unprotectable—only if there is no other possible way to
achieve the same technological utility. Avia Group Int’l,
Inc. v. L.A. Gear of Cal., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir.
1988); Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu-Kote Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d
1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (design is functional only if it
is “the only possible form of the article that could perform
its function.”). Needless to say, that almost never happens.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has found a claimed design
functional in only two published opinions, both issued
before 1996. 2
2. Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566-57
(Fed Cir. 1996); Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806
F.2d 234 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Federal Circuit remanded on the
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The Federal Circuit’s “only possible form” standard
for design patent functionality is much narrower than
this Court’s functionality standard for trade dress, under
which a feature is functional not only if it “is essential
to the use or purpose of the article” being sold, but also
if “it affects the cost or quality of the article.” TrafFix,
532 U.S. at 35. The inconsistency between the doctrines
is evident in this very case. The Federal Circuit held
Apple’s trade dress invalid as functional, but it affi rmed
liability for infringement of design patents on the very
same features. There is no justification in statutory text,
history, or policy for interpreting functionality differently
for design patents than for trade dress. This Court should
harmonize the design patent functionality doctrine with
its functionality precedents in trade dress law.
B. The Federal Circuit’s Infringement Approach
Permits Design Patent Owners Exclusivity
over Functional Aspects of Designs
Recent developments in design patent infringement
doctrine exacerbate the dangers in the Federal Circuit’s
meager view of functionality, making it even more likely that
design patents will give their owners unwarranted control
over utilitarian features. Design patent infringement
is determined by asking “whether an ordinary observer,
familiar with the prior art, would be deceived into thinking
that the accused design was the same as the patented design.”
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665,
672 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). Before 2008, courts applied
issue in two other cases. PHG Technologies, LLC v. St. John
Companies, Inc., 469 F.3d 1361 (2006); Chrysler Motors Corp. v.
Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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a “point of novelty” approach to the comparison, fi nding
infringement only if the accused design incorporated novel
and nonobvious aspects of the patentee’s claimed design. Id.
at 670-71. 3 The Federal Circuit rejected that approach,
holding that the ordinary observer test is the “sole test”
for determining infringement, id. at 678, 4 even when
“the patented design incorporates numerous functional
elements.” Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d
1288, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Many design patents cover designs that include
clearly functional features, and many cover designs
whose ornamentality in any ordinary sense of the term
is questionable at best. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P.
McKenna, Scope, __ Wm. & Mary L. Rev. __ (forthcoming
2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2660951. But
under current Federal Circuit law, the jury is no longer
required to exclude those functional elements from
consideration when it decides infringement. Under the
Federal Circuit’s unguided ordinary observer test, it is
all too possible that a design patent owner will be able to
prevent competitors from copying utilitarian features that
are unprotectable under utility patent law.

3. See also Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1188
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (“it is the non-functional, design aspects that are
pertinent to determinations of infringement”).
4. The Federal Circuit has also concluded that points of novelty
no longer are relevant to design patent validity. See, e.g., Int’l Seaway
Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1237–38 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
1253 (2011).
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The Federal Circuit’s analysis in Richardson
suggested that the problems caused by the Egyptian
Goddess infringement test might be mitigated by
construing design patent claims in light of “the distinction
between the functional and ornamental aspects of a
design.” 597 F.3d at 1293. The district court in that case,
after identifying the ornamental aspects of the patented
tool design, had deemed the accused design noninfringing
because its only similarities to the claimed design related
to unprotectable functional elements. Id. at 1295. The
Federal Circuit affi rmed, “agree[ing] that, ignoring the
functional elements of the tools, the two designs are indeed
different.” Id. at 1296.
S ub se quent development s h ave l i m it e d t he
effectiveness of the Richardson approach, however. The
Federal Circuit has not required district courts to apply
Richardson and fi lter out the unprotectable elements
of a design. Moreover, district courts have had trouble
applying Richardson in the common circumstance in
which claim construction and functionality are handled
separately. See, e.g., Weber-Stephen Prods. LLC v. Sears
Holding Corp., 2014 WL 5333364 (N.D. Ill. October 20,
2014) (“unlike the typical case, the Richardson trial court
was able to consider claim construction and functionality
together, with the benefit of a fully developed record at
trial”).
The Federal Circuit’s opinion in the present case
weakens Richardson still further by ruling that the
ordinary observer should not ignore utilitarian aspects
of the products in comparing the designs and that claims
should not be construed to eliminate elements that are
structural or “dictated by their functional purpose.” 786
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F.3d at 998. The court also deemed it unnecessary to
instruct jury members to compare only the ornamental
appearance of the accused product with the claimed
design, as long as the instructions “as a whole” informed
them that the patents claimed “the ornamental design” of
the devices – a black-letter definition of a design patent.
Id. at 999.

The facts of this case illustrate the importance of these
doctrinal developments. Apple’s patented design for the iPhone
is shown at the left of the figure above. One of Samsung’s
accused phones is shown at the right. The trade dress analysis
in the opinion recognizes that many features of Apple’s design,
such as rounded corners, a flat clear screen, and a bezel, are
functional. Moreover, Apple was not the first to come up with
a mobile computer with similar features.
An infringement analysis that excluded from the
comparison design elements that were functional or in the
prior art would recognize the narrowness of the patentable
aspects of Apple’s design and ask whether Samsung’s products
appropriated those aspects of the design that make it patentable.
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By moving away from that approach and emphasizing the
ordinary observer’s comparison of the overall designs, the
Federal Circuit creates a significant risk that a patentee will
prevail even if an observer would find the two designs similar
only because they share features that are functional or in the
prior art.
This Court has made clear that the functionality doctrine
exists to protect the public’s right to make use of functional
characteristics that are unpatentable or no longer protected
by a utility patent. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29-30. Giving a
design patent owner control over utilitarian features
undermines the policy goals of the functionality doctrine.
But that is precisely what results from the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of design patent functionality and infringement
law. This Court should grant review in order to align design
patent law with the important policy goals of the functionality
doctrine and render it consistent with the long-standing rules
of utility patent and trade dress law.
II. The Federal Circuit’s Decision Limit Profits
to Those Attributable to the Patented Design
Produces Absurd Results
A.

The Origin and Context of Section 289

Patent law has long included a damages apportionment
principle. While early patents tended to be on fairly simple
machines or chemical inventions, the industrial revolution
brought patents on small parts of large, multicomponent
inventions, such as locomotives. When courts awarded
damages or defendant’s profits for infringement of such
patents, they awarded damages attributable to the
patent rather than to the defendant’s product as a whole.
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In Garretson v. Clark, for example, this Court said the
patentee “must in every case give evidence tending to
separate or apportion the defendant’s profits and the
patentee’s damages between the patented feature and the
unpatented features . . . .” 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884).
In the nineteenth century, design patents were
treated no differently. In the Dobson cases, involving
carpets, this Court found that, while the design patents at
issue had been infringed, there was no evidence by which
a factfinder could distinguish the value of the patented
design from the value of the unpatented carpet itself.
As a result, the Court ultimately awarded only nominal
damages of $0.06. Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 18
(1886); Dobson v. Bigelow Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439 (1885);
Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439 (1885). That
result incensed many.
In 1887, when Congress rewrote the Patent Act, it
responded to these concerns by passing a new provision
addressing design patent infringement. That provision
set a floor of $250 for design patent damages and made
a defendant “further liable for the excess of such profit
over and above” $250. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 105, § 1, 24
Stat. 387, 387. The 1887 Act made defendants liable only
for knowing acts of design patent infringement, mitigating
any potential unfairness of the Act’s damages rule. As
Representative Butterworth put it, “no man will suffer
either penalty or damage unless he willfully appropriates
the property of another.” 18 CONG. REC. 836 (1887). The
House Report similarly assured that “an innocent dealer
or user is not affected.” H.R. REP. NO. 49-1966, at 4.
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B. Awarding a Defendant’s Entire Profits Makes
No Sense in the Modern World
The design patent damages provision remains,
albeit in substantially modified form, in what is now
section 289 of the Patent Act. Nowadays, however, design
patent infringement, like utility patent infringement, is
a strict liability claim, no longer requiring the knowing
appropriation emphasized by Congress when passing the
1887 Act.
Congress’s 1887 assumption that “it is the design
that sells the article”5 may still be true of carpets, but it
surely is not true of all products covered by design patents
today. The likelihood that a product incorporates more
than one patented design is much greater than it was in
1887. Design patents on virtual features, such as icons,
are particularly likely to overlap, and there are more and
more of them. Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Virtual
Designs, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 107 (2013) (documenting
the growth of virtual design patents). If there is more
than one patented design in a product, the assumption
that any particular patented design drives the sale of the
product falls apart.
That is what has happened in this case. Here is one of
Apple’s many design patents on its iPhone.6

5. H.R. REP. NO. 49-1966, at 3 (1886), reprinted in 18 CONG.
REC. 834 (1887).
6. U.S. Patent No. D618,677. fig.1 (fi led Nov. 18, 2008).
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Here is another Apple iPhone design patent.7

It is (barely) possible to argue with a straight face that
it is the shape and overall ornamental design of the iPhone,
rather than its functionality, that motivates consumers to
buy it. It is not even remotely plausible that the shape of
the Apple iTunes icon is what motivates people to buy the
whole iPhone. And it literally cannot be the case that the
phone shape patent and the iTunes icon patent are each
7. U.S. Patent No. D668,263. fig.1 (fi led Oct. 8, 2010).
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the sole driver of a consumer buying the phone. Notably,
all of the patents Apple asserted in this litigation cover
discrete parts, rather than the entire phone. And while
these patents on different aspects of the iPhone’s design
happen to be owned by the same company, there is no
reason to think that the same will always be the case for
similarly complex products.
Nor does all, or even most, of the value of a product
come from patented designs. People do not buy iPhones for
their appearance alone; they buy them for their functions.
Those functions contribute substantially to the phone’s
value and they are covered by many utility patents.
Indeed, by one estimate, there are 250,000 patents that
arguably cover various aspects of a smartphone. 8 To
conclude that one design patent drives the purchase of the
product, and therefore that the defendant’s entire profit is
attributable to infringing that patent, is to say that none
of those functional features contribute anything to the
value of the phone – a ludicrous proposition.
Indeed, for most products (excluding, say, fashion) it
is more plausible that a functional feature covered by a
utility patent drives demand than that a patented design
feature does. Yet even utility patent owners rarely are
awarded damages based on the entire value of the product.
In the rare case where that does happen, the utility
patent owner must have proved that the patent was the
basis for market demand. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Federal
Circuit’s interpretation of section 289 requires no such
8. See David Drummond, When Patents Attack Android,
G OOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Aug. 3, 2011), http://googleblog.blogspot.
com/2011/08/when-patents-attack-android.html.
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proof. It simply assumes that the only valuable thing about
a product is its design. That assumption is not plausible
in the modern world. See Mark A. Lemley, A Rational
System of Design Patent Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 219, 233 (2013).
Further, awarding the defendant’s entire profit based
on a plaintiff’s small contribution to a product’s value
would cause significant mischief, as this Court noted in
Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480 (1853):
If the measure of damages be the same
whether a patent be for an entire machine or
for some improvement in some part of it, then
it follows that each one who has patented an
improvement in any portion of a steam engine or
other complex machines may recover the whole
profits arising from the skill, labor, material,
and capital employed in making the whole
machine, and the unfortunate mechanic may be
compelled to pay treble his whole profits to each
of a dozen or more several inventors of some
small improvement in the engine he has built.
By this doctrine even the smallest part is made
equal to the whole, and ‘actual damages’ to the
plaintiff may be converted into an unlimited
series of penalties on the defendant.
We think, therefore, that it is a very grave error
to instruct a jury ‘that as to the measure of
damages the same rule is to govern, whether
the patent covers an entire machine or an
improvement on a machine.’
Id. at 490-91.
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Section 289 Does Not Require Disgorgement
of Profits Unrelated to the Patented Design

The proper interpretation of section 289 should
consider the provision as a whole. Section 289 currently
reads in its entirety:
Whoever during the term of a patent for a
design, without license of the owner, (1) applies
the patented design, or any colorable imitation
thereof, to any article of manufacture for the
purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale
any article of manufacture to which such design
or colorable imitation has been applied shall be
liable to the owner to the extent of his total
profit, but not less than $250, recoverable in any
United States district court having jurisdiction
of the parties.
Nothing in this section shall prevent, lessen, or
impeach any other remedy which an owner of
an infringed patent has under the provisions
of this title, but he shall not twice recover the
profit made from the infringement.
35 U.S.C. §289 (emphasis added).
Section 289 does say that a defendant is “liable to the
owner to the extent of his total profit.” Read literally, that
general language might permit damages beyond profits
from the sale of the infringing product. Nonetheless, basic
principles of remedies law require a plaintiff to show some
connection between the damages and the infringement.
As the Seventh Circuit put it in the copyright context, a
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plaintiff must do more than simply attach the defendant’s
income tax return to the complaint and say it wants all
the money that defendant made from whatever source.9
That basic principle has been applied in design patent
cases as well. Indeed, in one early design patent case, in
which the defendant sold refrigerators with door latches
that infringed the plaintiff’s patent, the court refused
to award the entire profits from refrigerators, instead
defaulting to the $250 statutory minimum because the
latch was not sold separately. Young v. Grand Rapids
Refrigerator Co., 268 F. 966, 973-74 (6th Cir. 1920). The
court required a connection between the design patent
and the profits awarded, and held that the owner of a
patent on a latch was not entitled to the entire profit
on the refrigerator. Similarly, the court in Bush &
Lane Piano Co. v. Becker Bros., 222 F. 902 (2d Cir. 1915)
opined:
The question which seems to have received little
attention upon the accounting, due probably to
the form of the decree, is whether the profits
made by the defendant should be the entire
profits of the sales of the piano and case or
the profits upon the sale of the case which
alone is the sole subject of the patent. We are
of the opinion that the latter rule should have
controlled the accounting.
9. Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th Cir. 1983) (“If
General Motors were to steal your copyright and put it in a sales
brochure, you could not just put a copy of General Motors’ corporate
income tax return in the record and rest your case for an award of
infringer’s profits.”).
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Id. at 903; see also Lemley, supra, at 235; Frederic H.
Betts, Some Questions Under the Design Patent Act of
1887, 1 YALE L.J. 181 (1892).
The final paragraph of section 289, prohibiting double
counting of the defendant’s profits and the plaintiff’s
losses, also supports awarding only the profits attributable
to the patented design. In defi ning “double counting,”
the statute refers to the defendant’s profits measure as
“the profit made from the infringement.” 35 U.S.C. §289.
That language clearly contemplates a focus on the profits
attributable to the patented design: the profit at issue in
a design patent case is not the defendant’s total profit, or
even defendant’s total profit from a single product, but the
profit “made from”—that is, causally derived from—”the
infringement.”
Further evidence in support of that interpretation
comes from another change to the statutory language. The
1952 Patent Act deleted language from the original statute
awarding profits “made by him from the manufacture or
sale, as aforesaid, of the article or articles to which the
design, or colorable imitation thereof, has been applied.”
That original language suggested that the profit to be
awarded was that associated with the articles as a whole,
rather than only that profit attributable to the patented
design. The deletion of that language, coupled with the
reference in the second paragraph to “profits made from
the infringement,” suggests an interpretation of section
289 that awards only those profits attributable to the
patented design.
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IV. Conclusion
This Court should grant certiorari to restore
functionality to its proper role in validity and infringement
inquiries and to reverse the Federal Circuit’s interpretation
of section 289.
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